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I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Department of Family Protective Services (Department)
descended upon the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints (FLDS) ranch on April 3, 2008 to remove 468 children from
their families.2 Accompanying the Department were dozens of police
officers, SWAT teams, helicopters, and an armored personnel carrier., It
was the largest child protection raid in the history of the United States,
yet the Department took possession of the children without a court
order.4 FLDS members described that "screaming children [were] torn
from the arms of their grief stricken mothers" and "unarmed fathers
[were] forced to the ground with M16 rifles."5 Children were removed
from the ranch on an emergency basis because the Department believed
all 468 children were in imminent danger due to a "pervasive belief
system" among the FLDS community that it "is acceptable for girls to
marry, engage in sex, and bear children as soon as they reach puberty." 6
The FLDS church, formerly led by Warren Jeffs, condones the practice
of polygamy.7 Only after removing the children did the Department
seek judicial authorization to place the children in state custody.' The
Texas district court ordered all of the children to remain in state care
and to submit to DNA testing.9
2. In re Tex. Dep't of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613 (Tex. 2008).
3. Nancy Perkins & Amie Joi O'Donoghue, FLDS at Ranch Detail Raid by Texas
Officials, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008, availableat http://deseretnews.com/article/content/
mobile/1,5620,695270749,00.html.
4. In re Tex. Dep't, 255 S.W.3d at 613-14 (stating "[T]he Department took possession of
all 468 children at the *614 Ranch without a court order. The Department calls this 'the largest
child protection case documented in the history of the United States.').
5. Letter from Mothers and Children of YFZ to George W. Bush, President (Apr. 10,
2008) (on file with author), availableat http://www.captivefldschildren.org/Pres%20Bush%20
Letter%205-10-08.pdf. "We are talking about homes being broken into without search warrants,
unarmed fathers being forced to the ground with M16 rifles pointed at their heads, screaming
children being torn from the arms of their grief stricken mothers." Id.
6. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008).
7. Texas
Sect Children
Return Home,
BBC News, June
3, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7431848.stm. The sect teaches that polygamy brings
glorification in heaven. Id. In 2007, Warren Jeffs, was convicted of first degree felony rape as an
accomplice for conducting a marriage between an underage woman and her nineteen-year old
cousin. See Nancy Perkins, Warren Jeffs Resigns as LeaderofFLDS Church, DESERET NEWS,
Dec. 5, 2007, availableat http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695233512,00.html.
8. In re Tex. Dep't, 255 S.W.3d at 613-14.
9. Sect Children Will Stay in State Custody, Judge Rules, CNN, Apr. 18, 2008,
A
Utah
judge
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/18/polygamy.custody/index.html.
sentenced him to two consecutive prison terms of five years to life; he will serve at least five
years. See Polygamist 'Prophet' To Serve at Least Ten Years in Prison, CNN, Nov. 20, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/lIl/20/jeffs.sentence/.
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In response to the court's order, thirty-eight mothers filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus in the Third District of the Texas Court of
Appeals.' 0 The women argued that the Department failed to meet its
burden of demonstrating that the children were in imminent danger that
required they be immediately removed from their homes." The Steed
court granted the writ, finding that there was no evidence of danger to
the physical health or safety of any of the young children.12
Furthermore, the court held that the existence of a belief system did not
put the children in physical danger. Even if the belief system constituted
a danger of sexual abuse, there was no evidence that the danger was
immediate or urgent.' 3 The Department then filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Supreme Court of Texas. The Texas court denied the
petition, agreeing with the reasoning of the court of appeals.14 All
children were returned to their families.' 5
National attention has been focused on FLDS and its religious
beliefs. Americans are concerned about stopping the FLDS from
practicing polygamy and conducting underage marriages. Of course, the
nation is correct that the laws prohibiting such behavior should be
enforced against those who violate them. However, the Constitution
requires that due process be given and privacy maintained despite the
possibility of criminal and perhaps to some, horrific behavior.
In the FLDS case, the Department used emergency removal as a
guise to exert significant power over individual families and their
children. The case illustrates that in the child removal context,
emergency removal is overused by child protective agencies, and in
many cases, securing prior judicial authorization is often unnecessary.
Furthermore, the case is evidence that family trial courts rubberstamp
agency decisions to remove children on an emergency basis.
This Note argues that the benefits of obtaining prior judicial
authorization outweigh the harms from choosing to delay in effectuating
child removals. Part II of this Note explains the removal process. Part
III then explores the federal constitutional and statutory standards
governing removal. Part IV sets forth the split amongst the federal
circuit courts of appeals on how the constitutional standards should
apply in the removal context. Finally, Part V argues that the split should
be resolved by narrowing the emergency exception to closely resemble
the criminal emergency exception. In doing so, courts will properly
balance the national interest in preserving family privacy with the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
In re Tex. Dep't of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. 2008).
Texas Sect Children Return Home, supranote 6.
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interest in ending child abuse, ensuring that an event similar to the
FLDS seizure does not occur.
II. REMOVAL GENERALLY

Removal is the "formal process by which a child is physically and
legally separated from his parents."' 6 One component of this process is
emergency removal. Emergency removal occurs when child protective
agencies or police officers separate children from their parents without
having received any prior judicial authorization.' 7 The basis for
emergency removal is that the government believes that immediate
removal is necessary to protect children from physical and mental
harm. Normally, child protective workers or police officers are
required to obtain permission from a court prior to removing a child.19
Nonetheless, academics agree that emergency removals are becoming
the norm rather than the exception. 2 0
In 2006, approximately 300,000 children were removed from their
homes by child protective agencies and placed in foster care. 2 1 Although
there is no hard data to substantiate the assertion, many of these
placements occurred after the child was seized on an emergency basis. 22
In 2006, child protective agencies across the nation made about 1.9
million determinations regarding whether abuse occurred and whether a
child was at risk of later abuse. 2 3 Of those 1.9 million determinations,
16. Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children From Abusive Parents: The Constitutional Value
ofPre-DeprivationProcess, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 915 (2004).
17. Id. (stating that "[riemoval includes not only an initial "rescue," whereby the child is
tentatively-perhaps temporarily-taken from the home, but also a host of intermediary steps,
like foster care .... ).
18. Paul Chill, Burden of ProofBegone, The PerniciousEffect of Emergency Removal in
Child Protective Proceedings,42 FAM. CT. REv. 540, 541 (2004). State officials should remove
children on an emergency basis when they believe that they are in imminent danger of physical
harm. However, in practice emergency removal is used when there is no such danger. Id. The
overuse of the emergency exception and the reasons for this recent development are discussed
further in the Note.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

MALTREATMENT
2006,
83
CHILD
hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/cmO6.pdf

2008),
available at
http://www.acf.
(June
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVS.].
22. See Chill, supra note 17, at 540-41 (explaining that "children are typically seized
without warning from their homes or schools; subjected to intrusive interrogations, medical
examinations, and/or strip searches; and forced to live in foster homes or group residences while
the legal system sorts out their future.").
23. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvS., supra note 20.
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approximately 1.1 million reports of abuse were unsubstantiated.24
While close to 500,000 reports were substantiated,2 5 substantiation
standards are also fairly broad.2 6 Thus, it can be inferred that some, if
not many, of the children placed in foster care after having been
removed on an emergency basis by child protective workers were
returned home. 2 7
Unnecessary removals harm children, parents, and the family in its
entirety. 28 Children are torn away from their parents without any
warning or time to prepare, thus creating the possibility of
psychological injury. Parents are also often shocked by the state's action
and consequently experience large amounts of stress. Moreover,
increases in the number of children being removed burdens the child
welfare systems of each state. Caseworkers become more overwhelmed
as they try to find placements for children, 29 and family court dockets
become more crowded, lengthening the delay in holding court
proceedings. 30
On the other hand, saving children from abuse or potential abuse is
important; protecting children is a worthwhile public endeavor. It is
recognizable that "[c]hild abuse and neglect can have a profound impact
on children's immediate and long-term mental and physical health."3 1
Nonetheless, broadening the ability of state workers to effectuate
immediate removals in order to investigate reports of abuse, does not
strike the correct balance between protecting the family's sanctity and
ending abuse.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Chill, supra note 17.
27. Id. (explaining that "it can be reasonably assumed that a significant number of other
children who are found maltreated, and for whom perhaps some intervention-short of
removal-is warranted, are nonetheless removed on an emergency basis.").
28. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 595 (2d Cir. 1999). If officers of the State
come to believe that they can never be questioned in a court of law for the manner in which they
remove a child from her ordinary care, custody and management, it is inevitable that they will
eventually inflict harm on the parents, the State, and the child. Id.
29. Tim Evans, DCS Removes Too Many Kids from Homes, Report Says, INDYSTAR.COM,
Nov. 8, 2008, http://www.indystar.com/article/20081108/LOCAL/811080441. "The influx is
clogging already congested juvenile courts, leaving thousands of children without the required
oversight of independent advocates and overwhelming the supply of foster and adoptive parents,
the report says." Id.
30. Chill, supra note 17, at 542.
31. Protecting Children, StrengtheningFamilies: ReauthorizingCAPTA: HearingBefore
the Sen. Subcomm. on Children & Families, 110th Cong., (2008) (statement of Dr. Cheryl Anne
Boyce, Chief, Child Abuse and Neglect Program), availableat http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/
2008/06/t20080626a.html.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS GOVERNING REMOVAL
The threshold standards for when state actors may remove a child
depend on the interpretation of two federal constitutional provisions.
First, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable government
search and seizure.32 Circuit courts have found that removal of children
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 33
Thus, because there is agreement among the circuit courts, it is likely
that the Supreme Court would find that the standards and exceptions
governing search and seizure apply when the government initially
separates a child from its parents. Second, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state afford a person due process
before it may deprive them of life, liberty, or property. 34 The Supreme
Court has recognized that parents have a liberty interest in caring for
and raising their children.3 Therefore, before removing children from
their parents, the government must ensure that the parents receive the
procedural process the Fourteenth Amendment promises them.
Notably, substantive due process is largely ignored by courts when
assessing the constitutionality of a child's removal. The Supreme Court
has held that "[w]here a particular [a]mendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that [a]mendment, not the more generalized
notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing
these claims." 36 Thus, because procedural due process applies in the
child removal context, those constitutional provisions must govern a
court's analysis, rather than substantive due process.
A. Determining What Process the State Owes
The Supreme Court requires that a court apply a two-step test when
it is presented with procedural due process challenges. 37 First, a court
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The amendment states in relevant part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated ..... Id.
33. See, e.g., Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 428
(5th Cir. 2008).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment states in relevant part: "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
35. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (explaining that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the "care, custody, and management of their child," which does
not evaporate when the parents have lost temporary custody of their children because the state
alleges the parents are unfit).
36. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 599 (2d Cir. 1999).
37. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). Due process is the "right to be
heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. (internal citations omitted).
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must initially determine whether the government deprived a person of a
liberty or property interest.3 8 Second, if a liberty or property interest is
at stake, then the court must apply a three-factor balancing test to decide
how much process is due before the state can commit the deprivation. 39
The following three factors will be weighed: the nature of the private
interest, the interest of the government, and the risk that the government
may erroneously deprive the person of his liberty or property interest. 40
When the factors are applied in a child removal setting, the rule is that
ordinarily a court proceeding must be accorded to the parents before the
court can grant an order permitting removal.4 ' In contrast, if Congress
or a state passes a law that confers upon persons a statutorily created
right rather than a constitutional right, the process afforded to a person
by the statute is usually sufficient to satisfy procedural due process.42
B. An UnreasonableSeizure Under the FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting
an unreasonable search and seizure. 4 3 It is designed to prevent abusive
and arbitrary governmental interference into the privacy of
individuals.4 To constitute a seizure, the government must take
possession of a person.45 In other words, all that is required to constitute
the seizure of a person is that an "officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
.... 46 The Supreme Court has applied the amendment to juvenile
arrests, but it has never explicitly held that the Fourth Amendment
applies in the context of child removals.4 7
Because due process is a flexible concept, the Court created three factors to balance. Id. at 33435. If each of these factors is balanced correctly, then the likelihood that due process will be
satisfied increases. See id.
38. Id. at 332.
39. Id. at 334-35.
40. Id.
41. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 593 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972)).
42. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001). If Congress creates federal law,
then private rights to enforce federal law must also be created by Congress. Id. A court cannot
create a remedy for a private person because it is solely within the domain of Congress to create
causes of action for statutorily created rights. Id. at 286-87.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... ).
44. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
45. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991).
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624-27 (discussing that the government may seize a
juvenile in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the amendment refers to the right of a
person to be free from unreasonable government intrusion).
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As stated in the text of the amendment, if the government conducts a
search, it must be reasonable. To be reasonable, the Supreme Court has
required that law enforcement officials obtain 4prior judicial
authorization before conducting a search and seizure. The judicial
authorization must also be supported by probable cause. 49 A warrantless
search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within an exception
to the warrant requirement.50 The exceptions are few and "jealously and
carefully drawn."5 1 The Court has explained that in criminal cases one
exception includes situations in which there are exigent circumstances
and probable cause. 52
Exigent circumstances exist when "there is compelling need for
official action and no time to secure a warrant."
"[W]here the
discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location
of the evidence and intend to seize it . .. [t]he requirement of a warrant
to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever . . . .
The Court has

defined the scope of this exception by the severity of the underlying
offense.55 It has also found that exigency "arises from the dan er of
harm to the arresting officer and of destruction of evidence ... ." For
example, hot pursuits of fleeing felons and destruction of evidence fall
within the definition of exigent circumstances. 57
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967). "[slearches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Id. at 357.
49. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214, 238 (1983) (stating that courts reviewing
probable cause determinations must apply a "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis which
requires the government show "a fair probability [exists] that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place").
50. United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984)).
51. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
52. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (explaining that a warrantless
search is objectively reasonable if the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling).
53. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
54. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470.
55. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984). Most courts have refused to condone a
warrantless search of a home when the underlying crime is not a felony, even if exigent
conditions exist. In Welsh, the Court explained that a warrantless search of a home is generally
impermissible when the underlying crime is minor and not a felony. Id. at 750. If the underlying
crime is a felony, however, and independent exigent conditions exist, a warrantless search is
permissible. Id. at 751-52. If the underlying crime is a felony, however, and independent exigent
conditions exist, a warrantless search is permissible. Id.
56. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 478.
57. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (finding hot pursuits fall
within the exigency definition); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (holding
that a risk that evidence will be destroyed is sufficient to search and seize without a warrant).
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Moreover, if there is no major offense or imminent physical harm
involved, then courts will usually not find exigent circumstances and
will therefore not approve of a warrantless search or seizure." As to
seizures conducted from a home, the Court has even more narrowly
defined the application of the exigent circumstances exception.5 9 It is a
"shocking proposition that private homes . . . may be indiscriminately

invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer."6 o Thus, if
there is a minor criminal offense conducted from the home, then the
exigent circumstances exception will rarely apply. 6 1
C. For Children'sRemoval: Apply the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments
While the Supreme Court has affirmatively found that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to child removals,6 2 it has
never expressly addressed whether children are afforded Fourth
Amendment protection when they are removed from their homes for
non-criminal purposes. However, the Court has held that Fourth
Amendment protections apply when children are arrested by the
government. Lower courts have expanded upon the Supreme Court's
application of the Fourth Amendment to child arrests by finding that
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment apply in the child removal
context.6 4 Specifically, a court order, the equivalent of a warrant, is
necessary prior to seizing a child who is abused or is at risk of abuse
unless exigent circumstances exist.6 5
Mark Brown believes that the lower courts are correct in applying
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to removals of children,
but that the two amendments should continue to be addressed separately
by courts.6 6 Although the Court has held that Fourth Amendment
58. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 750.
59. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 75-81 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 459-60
(1948)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
63. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-27 (1991).
64. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000). However, when
addressing the child's right to privacy, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is appropriate to apply.
See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998)).
65. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "[i]n the
context of a seizure of a child by the State during an abuse investigation . .. a court order is the
equivalent of a warrant").
66. Brown, supra note 15, at 955. The Supreme Court has resolved issues of juvenile
detention under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 254 (1984)
(finding that due process requires that juveniles be entitled to a hearing after being detained).
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standards sometimes are exclusive, Brown believes that the Court
would find that the standards are not exclusive in non-criminal cases. 6 7
Thus, it is appropriate to apply both amendments to child removals.
Furthermore, because the circuit courts have unanimously applied both
amendments, overturning persuasive precedent may not be wise.6 8
D. Statutory Causes ofAction to Bring Claimsfor Constitutional
Deprivationsby State Actors
Parents may allege Due Process and Fourth Amendment violations
in federal or state court by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
creates a cause of action for citizens whose constitutional rights were
violated by persons acting under color of state law. 6 9 To succeed on a
motion to dismiss or summary judgment, a plaintiff must overcome
qualified or absolute immunity protections that attach to state actors. 70
The qualified immunity doctrine protects state actors from suit unless
the actor has violated a clearly established constitutional right and a
reasonable state officer in the defendant's position would have known
that his conduct violated that right.71
67. Id. Brown finds support for his position in the recent Supreme Court case, United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), where the Court ruled that both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to forfeitures of real estate. United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1993). Because the case was not a
criminal one, the Fourth Amendment was not exclusive and the Fourteenth Amendment's more
flexible standards should apply. See id. The Court also reasoned that Fourteenth Amendment
due process is applicable because it demands more than the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment standards involve carefully balancing private
and governmental interests. Id. The Fourth Amendment standard, on the other hand, is mere
reasonableness. Id.
68. See Brown, supra note 15, at 955.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). The statute states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color .. . of any State .

.

. subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
70. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1993).
71. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). It is a two-step inquiry. First, do the facts
establish that the defendant violated a constitutional right? Id. Second, if the right is clearly
established, would it be clear to a reasonable state officer that the conduct constituted a
constitutional violation? Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In other words, would
it be clear to a reasonable officer that the course of action would be unlawful? See Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001). However, the order in which this two-step inquiry is conducted
is discretionary. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). In Pearson, the Court receded
from its holding in Saucier by finding that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to
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The Section 1983 cases focusing on child removals address whether
the state actors have violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 72
The courts of appeals have split on what conduct falls outside the
emergency removal exception and thus violates the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 7 The first cases to establish constitutional
standards for removal still resulted in defendants receiving qualified
immunity because the constitutional right was not clearly established.7 4
Nonetheless, for future cases, the same specific conduct would be a
violation of a clearly established constitutional right, which would then
decrease the likelihood that qualified immunity would apply to
defendants.

IV. DEFINING THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION INCHILD
REMOVALS-THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Several courts of appeals have articulated standards for removal of a
child under the emergency (exigent) circumstances exception. The
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted strict standards,
requiring that state actors believe that the child is in imminent danger
and that the actor is unable to obtain a warrant. This approach follows
the reasoning of traditional Fourth Amendment, criminal law
jurisprudence. The Eleventh, Fifth, and First Circuits have applied a
more flexible interpretation of the emergency circumstances
exception.76 These circuits believe that seizures due to allegations of
abuse uniquely connect to the Fourth Amendment. Emergency,
therefore, must be defined broadly to address the government interest in
protecting a child from abuse. Thus, there is a clear split amongst the
circuit courts in how the courts apply the emergency circumstances
exception to child removals.

determine which of the two prongs should be addressed first. Id. The circumstances of the case
should guide the trial court in making its determination. Id.
72. See, e.g., Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 587.
73. Compare Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 596 (finding that there is no emergency when there
is reasonably sufficient time to secure a count order), with Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1294-95
(explaining that it declines to adopt an inflexible rule requiring that the officer determine there is
insufficient time to obtain a court order).
74. See, e.g., Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 595-96.
75. See, e.g., Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003);
Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.
2001); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 581 (2d Cir. 1999).
76. See, e.g., Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429
(5th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (1 th Cir. 2003); Hatch v. Dep't for
Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
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A. The Narrow Approach: Requiring that There be Insufficient Time to
Secure a Court Order
Sarah Tenenbaum was a developmentally delayed five-year old
kindergartner living in New York City.7 7 Sarah's teacher asked her if
her father was hurting her and Sarah nodded yes. Without obtaining a
court order or parental consent, a caseworker removed Sarah from
school, determining that "emergency" protection was needed. Another
caseworker took Sarah to the emergency room where a doctor examined
her for sexual abuse by performing a gynecological exam. While she
was in the hospital, the New York Department of Social Services
contacted her parents. 1 No evidence of sexual abuse was found, and the
caseworkers returned Sarah to her parents. 82
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. and Mrs. Tenenbaum and Sarah
filed suit against the caseworkers the City of New York, and the New
York City Board of Education.8 On appeal, the court held that the
judicially unauthorized removal from school and the medical
examination of Sarah violated the Tenenbaums' and Sarah's procedural
due process, as well as Sarah's Fourth Amendment right.8 4 As for
procedural due process, the court balanced the parents' interests against
the state's interest.8 5 It held that as a matter of law there were no
emergency circumstances that permitted Sarah's removal from school
without prior judicial authorization.86 The court articulated the
following emergency exception standard:
if the danger to the child is not so imminent that there is
reasonably sufficient time to seek prior judicial authorization, ex
parte or otherwise, for the child's removal, then the
circumstances are not emergent; there is no reason to excuse the
absence of the judiciary's participation in depriving the parents of
the care, custody and management of their child.8

77. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 588.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 590-91.
80. Id. at 591. The exam was particularly invasive. See id. It included the "insertion of a
cotton swab in Sarah's vagina and anus." Id.
81. Id. at 587, 591.
82. Id. at 591.
83. Id.
84. Id at 596, 599, 602.
85. Id. at 593-94.
86. Id. at 594.
87. Id.
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In the court's view, requiring a showing that there was no time to
obtain a court order prevents the evaporation of pre-seizure procedural
due process. Similar to the criminal context, state officials have
"necessary latitude" to secure necessary removals when the
circumstances warrant removal, but officials do not have "infinite
license."89 The court further recognized that this standard, by preventing
unnecessary removal, would help maintain the "child's psychological
well-being . .. and relationship to the family." 90
In addition, the Tenenbaum court held that Sarah's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated
when she was removed by caseworkers from school without a warrant. 91
The Tenenbaum court first found that Sarah's removal constituted a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.92 It recognized
that if "exigent circumstances" existed, then a warrantless seizure was a
"reasonable" seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.9 3 In the child
abuse context, exigent circumstances exist if "a person of reasonable
caution [believes] that a child is subject to the danger of abuse if not
removed from school before court authorization can be reasonably
obtained." 94 Thus, if there is time to obtain judicial authorization before
removing a child, then exigent circumstances do not exist and the
seizure is unconstitutional. The state actors in Sarah's case violated
Sarah's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Nonetheless, because there was no "clearly established law" under the
Fourth Amendment from which the state actors could have concluded
that the emergency circumstances exception did not apply, qualified
immunity precluded the state actors from liability.95
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have agreed with the Second Circuit
and similarly adopted a narrower view of the emergency exception. The
Ninth Circuit, in Rogers v. County of San Joaquin,96 stated that
emergency circumstances exist if there is "reasonable cause to believe
that the child is likely to experience serious bodily harm in the time that
would be required to obtain a warrant." 97 In Rogers, the children were
88. Id. at 594-95.
89. Id. at 595.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 604.
92. Id. at 602.
93. Id. at 604.
94. Id. at 605.
95. Id. at 599, 605-06. For future cases, however, similar conduct by a state official would
constitute a violation of a clearly established law. Id. at 596. Thus, in the Second Circuit state
officials are put on notice to be wary when conducting an emergency removal, especially if it
involves an unconsented physical examination of a child. Id.
96. Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007).
97. Id. at 1294.
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malnourished, suffered from bottle rot, lived in a disorderly home, and
one child was sometimes locked in her room at night.9 8 Although these
conditions may have constituted abuse, there was no risk that the
children would incur serious bodily harm in the time it would take for
the caseworker to obtain a court order authorizing the removal. 99
In Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson,'oothe Tenth Circuit held that the
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment did not
apply when a child was removed from a home and there was no
evidence that the child was in immediate threat of death or severe
physical harm.' 0 The circuit court applied the criminal law standard,
stating that "where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know
in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it . . . [t]he

requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience
whatever. "102 In other words, "unless the child is in imminent danger,
there is no reason that it is impracticable to obtain a warrant before
social workers remove a child from the home." 03 The child was not in
immediate danger because the caseworkers and doctors had suspected
for a long time that the child was the victim of Munchausen's Syndrome
by Proxy.104 When the workers removed the child, nothing about the
child's condition seemed unusual. 05
The Tenth Circuit also found that the parents' Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights were violated since there were no
emergency circumstances justifying the child's immediate removal from
the home without notice or a hearing.106 The circuit court concluded that
the law had been clearly established as to the parents' Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim. 0 7 Because no process had been given to
the child's parents without any evidence of exigent circumstances, the
caseworkers violated clearly established law. 8 Consequently, the
Roska court remanded the case to determine if the state actors were
entitled to qualified immunity.109

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1298.
Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1241.
Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971)).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1240-41.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id. at 1251.
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B. The Less StringentApproach: The "Totality of the
Circumstances" View
On the opposite side of the spectrum is Doe v. Kearney,"l0
decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 2003. This case established that
exigent circumstances can exist even when there is time to obtain prior
judicial authorization."' In Doe, the Department of Children and
Families removed three children determining they were in danger of
suffering abuse from their father. 12 The caseworker discovered that the
father had been accused, but never charged, of sexually abusing a
minor. 1 13 After interviewing each member of the family, the caseworker
decided to remove the children from the home.1 14 Subsequentyr1 John
Doe and his wife brought actions in a Florida district court. The
complaint alleged that the Florida statute authorizing emergency
removal was unconstitutional,' 1 6 and that regardless, the caseworker
violated their constitutional rights to due process and to be free from
unreasonable seizures. 11 7 On appeal, the court found that the caseworker
did not violate any of the Does' constitutional rights.' 18 The Doe court
explained that whether the caseworker violated the right to due process
depended on whether the caseworker removed the children in the
absence of an "emergency." 9 9 The Does argued that "if there is time to
obtain a court order without exacerbating the risk to the child, then there
can never be an emergency and the state must obtain a court order no
matter how emergent the child's circumstances otherwise appear." 20
Rejecting the Does' reasoning, the circuit court adopted a more relaxed
standard-one that looked to the totality of the circumstances.121 Under
this approach, courts should be allowed to consider all relevant
circumstances, including the "state's reasonableness in responding to a

110. 329 F.3d 1286 (1 Ith Cir. 2003).
111. See id.at 1295.
112. Id. at 1290-91.
113. Id. at 1290.
114. Id at 1291.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1299.
119. Id. at 1294. The circuit court acknowledged that "emergency" is synonymous with
"exigency" and "imminent danger." Id. at 1294 n. 10.
120. Id. at 1294-95.
121. Id at 1295.
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perceived danger as well as the objective nature, likelihood, and
immediacy of danger to the child."l 22
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the dissenting judge in
Tenenbaum, who argued that the Second Circuit's majority holding
would "tip [] the constitutional balance away from the state's paramount
interest in protecting children."123 The flexibility of due process requires
a case by case approach-it cannot be satisfied by having a carte
blanche rule that asks whether there was time to get a warrant. 4
In applying this flexible standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that
emergency circumstances existed when the caseworker removed the
Does' children, and thus, no constitutional violation of due process
occurred. 125 The caseworker received a report of child abuse, and upon
further investigation, discovered that John Doe had a criminal record of
abuse.126 Also, the caseworker did not delay in investigating the safety
of John Doe's children.127 Rather, the caseworker took swift action after
the "relevant facts came to her attention." 28 The Eleventh Circuit held
that the state's interest in securing the safety of the children outweighed
the family's interest in obtaining prior judicial authorization. 12 9 Finally,
it concluded that the Does' Fourth Amendment claim failed for the
same reason: no unreasonable seizure occurred because emergency
circumstances existed at the time of the removal.130
In a recent 2008 case, the Fifth Circuit set forth its view on the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards that apply in child
removals.131 Noting initially that seizing a child who may be the victim
of abuse was a "different dynamic" than seizing a criminal suspect, the
circuit court found that the child's interest in being safe from harm
potentially aligned with the state's interest in protecting the child.'3 2
With that in mind, the circuit court decided to adopt the flexible Doe v.
Kearney standard: the exception applies if "based on the totality of the
circumstances, there is reasonable cause to believe that the child is in

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1297.
124. Id. at 1297-98.
125. Id. at 1299.
126. Id. at 1298.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1299 (holding that the warrantless removal did not violate the Does' rights to
due process).
130. Id. at 1299.
131. Gates v. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 434-35 (5th Cir.
2008).
132. Id. at 427-28.
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imminent danger of physical or sexual abuse if he remains in his

home."'

33

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the child protective workers acted
within the scope of the exigent circumstances exception when they
removed the Gates' children because some of the children disclosed that
their father had hit them, required them to throw up food, and had
handcuffed one child to his bed as punishment for stealing food.134
Also, the circuit court recognized that no evidence was presented that
the workers would have been able to gather the information regarding
the father's abuse in enough time to secure judicial authorization prior
to the close of business. 5 Finally, the circuit court found that the
record showed the Texas workers considered and ruled out other
options that would not require removing the children from their
home.136 Upon balancing these facts, the circuit court held that the
children's seizure was reasonable under the emergency circumstances

standard.13 7
V.

RESOLVING THE SPLIT

The FLDS child raid demonstrates the magnitude of the state's
overuse of the emergency circumstances exception. Although the Texas
appellate courts eventually found that the state workers removed the
children without any evidence of showing an emergency, the Fifth
Circuit still broadly applies the emergency exception for child
removals.13 8 Even if there had been some evidence of past or future
abuse, the Texas caseworkers would have likely been able to
constitutionally seize the children under the emergency exception.
Under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation,139 the Texas caseworkers would
not have to assess whether there would be sufficient time to secure
judicial authorization before removing children.
This section argues that prior judicial authorization should be
presumptively required before a law enforcement official may remove a
child. It also argues that the emergency exception should be narrowly
construed to require caseworkers to determine whether there is
sufficient time to obtain judicial authorization without putting the
133. Id. at 429.
134. Id. at 429-30.
135. Id. at 430.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 430.
138. See, e.g., Gates, 537 F.3d at 429 (applying the flexible, totality of the circumstances
approach).
139. The Fifth Circuit's interpretation was set forth clearly in Gates. Id.
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child's health or safety at risk. Only when there is insufficient time to
secure a warrant, is the emergency removal of children appropriate.
A. Balancingthe Interests: Are We EndangeringMore Children?
Procedural due process requires that the government play fair. In the
child removal context, parents, families, and the government have
interests at stake. Courts have defined and weighed these interests
differently. In Kearney, the court weighed heavily the government's
interest in sheltering a child from abuse.140 Because that interest was
paramount, the court tipped the scale in favor of a broad interpretation
of the emergency exception.14 1 The court in Tenenbaum recognized,
however, that unrestricted government access to children will
"inevitabl[y] ... inflict harm on the parents, the State, and the child."l 42
Thus, in the Second Circuit, there is a restricted interpretation of the
emergency removal exception.
While the Kearney Court recognized that the state has an interest in
sheltering children from abuse, it failed to weigh that interest alongside
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parental interest in the care of
children. The error rate in child abuse investigations is significant.'143
Children are often removed without a court order only to be returned a
few days later. The FLDS raid is an example of such an erroneous
deprivation; four hundred sixty-eight children were removed from their
families when there was no evidence that the children were in danger or
that the danger was so imminent that workers had no time to secure
judicial authorization prior to removing the children.144 The raid
illustrates what social workers term "defensive social work."l45 It is a
"protect the children at all costs" approach to conducting child abuse
investigations and it continues to be more common in child welfare
agencies.146 One department went so far as to ignore the decision of a
court that ordered the department to adopt different procedures.' 47 After
Tenenbaum was decided, a top city lawyer wrote to the agency and
140. Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003).
141. Id. at 1299.
142. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 595 (2d Cir. 1999).
143. Brown, supra note 15, at 980.
144. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008).
145. Chill, supranote 17, at 542.
146. Id. at 547-48.
147. Leslie Kaufman, City Often Took Children Without Consulting Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FO7EFD9123DF
93BA15753CIA9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&emc=etal. City officials also defended the policy
as one that errs on the side of caution, prevents unnecessary harm to children, and avoids the
risk that children will unnecessarily die. Id. City officials who decided to remove children on an
emergency basis would be "vigorously defended" in court for doing so. Id.

2009]1

RAID OF THE MASSES: HOW THE SEIZURE OF FLDS CHILDREN SUPPORTS

291

stated that the agency "should go about their normal jobs as they always
have, secure in the knowledge that the city stands behind them and will
back that up."l 48
The reality of the save the children mantra is that more children are
removed than is necessary. The effect of these unnecessary removals is
that children and their parents suffer enduring psychological, emotional,
and financial harm. Ideally, abused children should be saved by the
government without these negative results. However, the solution to
child abuse does not lie in courts granting state workers greater
discretion to remove children. Rather, there is a more complicated
problem that pervades child protective departments. Caseworkers are
undertrained, overworked, and understaffed. Pay is poor and turnover
rate is high."'9 Common sense indicates that if caseworkers underwent
training similar in intensity to police officer trainings, then the rate of
erroneous removals would likely decrease. Likewise, if caseworkers
were paid more, people would have greater incentive to perform public
service.
B. Fourth Amendment Deterrence
Even without these institutional changes to child protective
departments, the risk of an erroneous removal is reduced by having
judicial authorization prior to removing a child. In the criminal context,
the warrant requirement exists to deter police misconduct and to
minimize the number of searches conducted without probable cause. 5 0
Consequently, mere inconvenience in securing a warrant cannot justify
a warrantless search or seizure.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has created the exclusionary rule,
requiring that evidence seized from an unconstitutional search be
suppressed at trial. 5 1 The intended net effect is that law enforcement
148. Id.
149. Brown, supra note 15, at 961-62, 980. Turnover of child welfare workers is estimated
to be between 30% and 40% annually nationwide. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD
WELFARE: HHS COULD PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN HELPING CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES RECRUIT
AND RETAIN STAFF 9 (2003), available at http://www. gao.gov/new.items/d03357.pdf. Rates
range from a low of zero percent to a high of 600%. Id. at 5.
150. See United States v. Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (stating that "[t]he
exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct" and supporting the
proposition that police negligence is not enough to trigger the exclusionary rule).
151. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). "The essence
of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. The
exclusionary rule is helpful, also, because it does not require a separate suit to determine how
much harm a defendant has suffered. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment
Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 883 (1991). However, it has its disadvantages in that it provides
an incentive for police officers to lie at suppression hearings and increases the likelihood of
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officials will be more likely to obtain a warrant in those cases where the
facts pose a close call.1 52 Fear of possible liability in a civil suit or of
evidence suppression serves to deter law enforcement from searching
without a warrant.'5 3 Finally, the criminal standard for warrants is easy
to apply. Law enforcement officers recognize the bright-line rule: in all
but the most extreme cases, they must secure a warrant.
Similar warrant standards and deterrent effects should exist for child
removals. If state workers face potential liability for failing to secure
judicial authorization prior to removal, the number of emergency
removals will decrease. 5 4 Workers will have incentives to obtain
judicial authorization in all but the most compelling cases-those cases
where the danger is so imminent that there is inadequate time to obtain
judicial authorization prior to removing the child. If workers know that
there are clearer parameters for emergency removals, they will be more
likely to stay within those parameters. Assuming such clear parameters
had existed in the FLDS case, the state actors would have likely
obtained an authorization to seize over four hundred children. Even if
conditions at the ranch had presented some evidence of sexual abuse,
the danger would not have risen to the level of harm that would permit
an emergency removal.
Moreover, judges are known to "maintain the status quo" and are
hesitant to disturb a child's current living situation. For example, a 2000
report made to New York City's child welfare agency stated that "in
many cases Family Court judges simply rubber-stamped decisions to
remove children from their families made by caseworkers in the
field."'15 In the FLDS case, the trial judge clearly rubber-stamped the
state's removal decision. Richard Wexler, the executive director of the
National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, stated in response to
the FLDS seizure that "every judge knows that if she rubber stamps
removals, the children may be hurt, but the judge is safe .... Send one
child home and have something go wrong and the udge's career may
well be over. In this case, multiply that by 416."' Additionally, once
judge bias against a defendant. Id. at 914. If a defendant is found with incriminating evidence,
then a judge must decide to exclude it, and if he does, must maintain an impartial mind. See
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 883-84
(1991) (explaining the problems of the exclusionary rule).
152. See Brown, supra note 15, at 981.
153. Stuntz, supra note 150, at 883, 907 (stating "[i]n a damages system, warrants are
primarily useful as an indirect way of dealing with valuation and deterrence problems").
154. Brown, supra note 15, at 981. Brown concludes that there are few disadvantages to
the warrant requirement. Id. at 982. "The volume of removal will decrease, which will likewise
reduce the number of erroneous rescues." Id.
155. Kaufman, supra note 146.
156. James Thalman, Vague Child Laws Make FLDS Case Murky, DESERET NEWS, Apr.
17, 2008, availableat http://www. deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695271144,00.html. Richard
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children are removed, it is more difficult for them to escape the
dependency system they are sucked in. One author termed it the
"snowball effect."' Finally, a presumption of requiring prior judicial
authorization will not likely deplete additional judicial resources. Postdeprivation hearings are already required in most jurisdictions after a
child is removed without prior authorization. The prior authorization
requirement will simply result in having a hearing earlier if a child
protection agency decides to remove a child.
VI. CONCLUSION

Child protection agencies in some jurisdictions can wield enormous
power when determining whether to remove children. In other
jurisdictions, a narrow emergency circumstances exception limits some
of this power. Though it is unfortunate that so many children and
families suffered harm, perhaps the FLDS story will compel circuit
courts and even the Supreme Court to formulate a constitutional limit on
emergency removal that ensures such an erroneous deprivation will not
occur again. Only then will courts be able to properly balance family
dignity alongside the need to end child abuse.

Wexler, among others, says that "almost none of the normal protections of due process of law
that Americans expect apply in child welfare proceedings--especially when it comes to
emergency removal power and actions taken before the first court hearing." Id
157. Chill, supra note 17, at 542. In reality, the parents carry additional burdens once their
children are removed. Id. They must prove that they are fit parents, even though the law still
requires that the state bear the ultimate burden of proving unfitness. Id. Prior to removal,
however, the child protective agency indisputably carries the burden of proving that the parents
are unfit. Id.

294

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

